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Espionage as a Sovereign
Right under International
Law and its Limits
by Asaf Lubin1
It is indispensable for a sovereign to obtain information on
his subjects and his soldiers, on all which happens near him
or in distant regions, and to know about everything which is
occurring, be it of small or great importance. If he does not
do so, this will prove a disgrace, a proof of his negligence
and neglect of justice... Sending out police agents and spies
shows that the ruler is just, vigilant, and sagacious. If he
behaves as I have indicated, his state will flourish.
- Nizam Al-Mulk, Persian scholar and
vizier of the Seljuq empire (11th century)
T he literature surrounding the international legality of peacetime
espionage has so far centered around one single question: wheth-
er there exist within treaty or customary international law prohibi-
tive rules against the collection of foreign intelligence in times of
peace. Lacking such rules, argue the permissivists, espionage functions
within a lotus vacuum, one in which States may spy on each other and on
each other's nationals with no restrictions, justifying their behavior through
the argumentum ad hominem of "tu quoque"
Prohibitionists, on the other hand, have launched a quest to find such ex-
pressive constraints within the lex lata, citing as potential candidates rules
surrounding territorial integrity; sovereign equality; non-intervention; prin-
ciples concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States; the in-
violability of diplomatic and consular communications; state immunity and
state ownership rights over certain types of property; States' good faith
obligations and obligations to settle disputes through peaceful means; the
international protection of trade secrets and intellectual property; certain
regulations on the use of the global commons (the waters, airspace, outer-
space, and cyber-space); international telecommunications law; and the
international human right to privacy. However, this quest has so far been
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futile, as prohibitionist scholars refuse to come to
grips with the insurmountable realization that na-
tion states have simply accepted, either openly or
tacitly, the prevalence and importance of peace-
time espionage as a necessary tool in international
affairs.
This discourse is self-serving. By calling for a
complete ban, prohibitionists effectively refuse
to accept any part of the practice as reflective of
custom. These scholars thus feed into the "myth
system" of prohibitive rules, in what seems to be
an attempt to maintain their perceived higher mor-
al ground. By doing so, however, they avoid engag-
ing the actual laborious challenge of drawing out
some practical limiting lines and regulations within
peacetime espionage. This plays into the hands
of permissivists who continue to operate under
a guise of presumed lawlessness, accepting as a
necessary evil the inevitable race to the bottom
of their grand strategy. In the process, new intel-
ligence agencies emerge, rogue elephants, "well-
springs of power in our society, secret clubs for
the elites and privileged."2 These agencies find,
in the conduct of their operations, few de jure and
de facto legal restrictions on both their bases for
action and choice of means.
In this article, I thus propose an alternative ap-
proach to the scholarly debate on the international
law of peacetime espionage. I first introduce the
notion of a Jus Ad Explorationem, or a right to spy,
as a sovereign right within the domaine r6serv6 of
States. I contend that the existence of this right
finds its underpinning in both historical and con-
temporary international law. Moreover, I argue that
by acknowledging spying as an acta jure imperi, a
power exclusively granted to sovereign nations,
we would finally be able to move away from the
paralyzing debate as to the lawfulness of spying
and begin drafting meaningful regulations on the
way States enjoy their right to spy. Within the lim-
its boundaries of this article, I take a first step at
offering one such limiting standard, that relating
to the prohibition on espionage as a form of anti-
diplomacy in reference to the doctrine of abuse of
rights.
I. The Historical Dimensions of the Jus Ad Ex-
plorationem
One of the primordial foundations of international
law is the capacity of States, as legal entities, to
be the bearers of both rights and duties. Professor
and diplomat Phillip Marshall Brown once argued
that of the rights endowed with States, "the solid
rock of international law," is the right of states to
exist, which he defined as a "mutual guarantee
between nations, great and small, of their legal
right to a separate existence in order to realize
their own aspirations and destinies."3The ICJ in its
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion similarly rec-
ognized the "fundamental right of every State to
survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defense
[...] when its survival is at stake'.
Perhaps as fundamental as the rights of a sover-
eign to exist and to defend itself, and as innately
linked to those rights, is the right of that sovereign
to spy. As Sun Tzu, the Chinese strategist, taught
us as early as the 6th century, in his masterpiece
The Art of War, it is foreknowledge ascertained
through "spies and spies alone" that enables "the
wise sovereign... to achieve things beyond the
reach of ordinary men'! As later restated in the
11th century by Nizam AI-Mulk, in the above cited
quote, it is in fact "indispensable for a sovereign"
to routinely collect intelligence on "everything
which is occurring" both near and far. These are all
logical deductions, for insofar as a sovereign has
a right to survival, that right must entail the corol-
lary liberty to collect information on all potential
threats to its existence, so to be able to effectively
thwart such dangers before they materialize.
Moving forward in time, to the days of European
Enlightenment in the age of the Renaissance,
intelligence was worshipped as if it were an om-
nipotent god. Sir Francis Bacon, one of the most
prolific philosophers and jurists of the time, ar-
gued that the very sovereignty of man "lieth hid in




knowledge." He glorified in The New Atlantis the
information acquired by explorers, discoverers,
spies, and intelligencers, all working on behalf of
the reigning monarchs. He wrote:
That they should have knowledge of the lan-
guages, books, affairs of those that lie such a
distance from them, it was a thing we could not
tell what to make of, for that it seemed to us a
condition and propriety of divine powers and be-
ings to be hidden and unseen to others and yet
to have others open and as in a light to them.
The New Atlantis was published in 1627, only 21
years before the peace of Westphalia which led
to the formation of the modern European nation
states. In those days the Jus Ad Explorationem
was beginning to take a more structured shape,
as espionage was employed to protect and serve
the interest of the crown and developed as a re-
sult a set of unique features. First, it is important
to note that in Hohfeldian terms the right to spy
was always considered a liberty right (a privilege)
not a claim right (a right proper). In other words,
the right of sovereign X to spy did not entail an
obligation on the part of sovereign Y to allow or en-
able sovereign Xto successfully do so.The right of
Queen Elizabeth to engage in espionage against
Mary, Queen of Scots, or King Phillip II of Spain,
was thus only a freedom, a privilege. It did not in
any way negate Queen Mary or King Phillip from
attempting to prevent or thwart Elizabeth's secret
intelligence plots. This nature of the Jus Ad Explo-
rationem as a liberty right persists today and is
manifested in the domestic prohibition against es-
pionage, which has been legislated into the crimi-
nal codes of most civilized nations. It is crucial to
emphasize, therefore, that the existence of these
modern criminal sanctions against spying in most
domestic systems does not in any way entail a
conflict with the parallel existence of a right to spy
as a liberty right on the international plane.
A second distinct feature of the Jus Ad Explora-
tionem during the Enlightenment was that espio-
nage was performed solely by sovereigns and on
their behalf. It was only the crown that had the
capacity and the means to establish the complex
networks of spies necessary to effectively collect
foreign intelligence. The spymasters of the time
were all resident ambassadors in the service of
the crown. They would often barter information in
exchange for certain diplomatic favors including
the promise of royal pardons, the resolution of lo-
cal trade disputes, or the assurance of the court's
future patronage. These ambassadors also did not
shy away from the occasional bribe, often times
paying out of their own pocket. These payoffs
were seen as an investment for these diplomatic
servants. Each of them competed with other rival
officeholders, knowing that valuable intelligence
will be rewarded with prestige and authority. Spies
and spymasters alike thus viewed the business of
espionage as an inherently sovereign profession,
with the monarchy as the marketplace and foreign
intelligence information as the primary currency.
Finally, a third feature of the Westphalian JusAdEx-
plorationem was that its scope and reach were not
restricted by any limiting standard. Everyone, and
everything, was a legitimate target, and there was
no definition of categories of people or activities
that may or may not be subjected to surveillance -
as all information could serve the interests of the
crown. Consider for example, Sir Francis Walsing-
ham, viewed by some as the father of modern in-
telligence agencies. Walsingham's responsibilities
as Principal Secretary in the Court of Queen Eliza-
beth, a post he accepted in December 1573, en-
tailed an exorbitant task: to "understand the state
of the whole realm... to know who was who in
every shire, and city, and town''To accomplish this
incredible feat, Walsingham carefully devised and
constructed a web of spy networks. He paid off
travelers in the ports of Lyon and merchant adven-
turers in the bazaars of Hamburg. He contracted
with Scottish exiles living in Italy and with English
soldiers of fortune in the pay of the Dutch. He
turned to low-level ships' captains from Prague and
expatriate traders from Barbary, but also to Men of
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Letters, poets, scholars, and scientists right from
the heart of London. All of these spies kept their
eyes open and their mouths shut, reporting back
to him, and him alone, per his demand. Knowledge
was never too dear, and Walsingham saw to it that
he was always well supplied. He filled book after
book with records "of every diplomatic matter, ev-
ery fact or bit of data that might prove useful in
England's future dealings abroad. His office piled
high with such books... and then, on top of all of
these foreign papers, there was an even greater
heap, an avalanche of books and papers devoted
to all of the domestic affairs that also fell within
the Secretary's endless purview. Walsingham's
office ledger went on page after page, cataloguing
them all." 4 The result of this enterprise was a 16th
century mass surveillance program, which consid-
ered no source of intelligence too strange and no
piece of information too mundane or obscure to
be collected.
II. Modern International Law and the JusAd Ex-
plorationem
Former ICJ Judge Phillip C. Jessup wrote the fol-
lowing in his treatises of 1946, A Modern Law of
Nations:
Sovereignty, in its meaning of an absolute, un-
controlled state will, ultimately free to resort to
the final arbitrament of war, is the quick-sand on
which the foundations of traditional international
law are built. Until the world achieves some of
form of international government in which a col-
lective will takes precedent over the individual
will of the sovereign state, the ultimate function
of law, which is the elimination of force for the
resolution of human conflicts, will not be fulfilled.
Like the legal attribute of equality, the function
of sovereignty as a legal concept was to protect
the state in a world devoid of any alternative to
self-protection. The gradual development of ad-
equate modernized law and organization should
provide such an alternative... Once it is agreed
that sovereignty is divisible and that it therefore
is not absolute, various restrictions on and relin-
quishments of sovereignty may be regarded as
normal and not stigmatizing.
Since Judge Jessup wrote the above, two major
tectonic shifts have occurred changing the land-
scape of the doctrine of sovereignty in internation-
al politics. The first came with the introduction, at
the end of WWII, of a new world order structured
around the U.N. Charter and its prohibition on the
use of force and the principle of non-intervention.
The second came at the end of the Cold War with
the reorientation of the purposes of the interna-
tional security system in light of the rise to preemi-
nence of individual human rights. Given the natural
connection between sovereignty and espionage,
as depicted thus far, it should come as no surprise
that these two tectonic shifts also influenced the
nature and character of the Jus Ad Explorationem.
I wish to focus my analysis on the first tectonic
shift, that relating to the post-Charter world order.
Nonetheless, let me begin by making a few gen-
eral observations pertaining to the second shift,
concerning human rights. The right to privacy has
long been recognized as a fundamental human
right enshrined in the United Nations' Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and in many
other international and regional treaties. How-
ever, it wasn't until recently that we witnessed
a new appreciation and interest in the right ac-
companied by a "rising tide of opinion against
mass surveillance."5 This global attitude has been
expressed by international, regional, and domes-
tic institutions and courts; by the world's largest
technology companies; by political figures and civil
society; and by the public writ large. It has been
manifested, inter alia, in the creation of the posi-
tion and appointment of a special rapporteur on
the right to privacy by the Human Rights Council,
in the creation of various privacy-enhancing codes-
of-conduct for internet companies like Google, Ya-
hoo!, and Microsoft, in the further advancement
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of anonymity-enabling technologies like Onion
Routing, Off-the-Record Messaging, and various
encryption-based services, as well as in a series of
groundbreaking judgments of the European Court
of Human Rights beginning with Weber v Germa-
ny, and leading up to the more recent Zakharov
v. Russia and Sazabd and Vissy v Hungary. If the
rise in surveillance had once "been greeted with
extraordinary equanimity" 6 the current backlash
marks a momentous shift as a new social contract
is drafted between governments and their gov-
erned, and between telecom companies and ser-
vice providers and their consumers. This redrafting
of the rules surrounding surveillance and the right
to privacy in the digital age is still ongoing and is
influenced by the ever-advancing technologies in
the field of government surveillance.
But what can we say about the effects of the first
shift, the one concerning the restructuring of a
new world order engineered by the drafters of the
Charter? The prohibition on the use of force and
on coercive interventions seems to have had only
minor effects on the right to spy. Indeed, Articles
2(4) and 2(7) of the Charter should be read in light
of the inherent right for individual self-defense,
enshrined in Article 51. As was already noted, in-
telligence gathering in this sense is a corollary of
the right of the state to exist. It is thus necessary
"to give substance and effect to the right of self-
defense, including the customary international law
right of anticipatory or peremptory self-defense."
Given that "[alppropriate defensive preparations
cannot be made without information about poten-
tial threats,"7 the Jus Ad Explorationem can thus
be read into the Charter Article 51 global security
structure. In other words, to the extent that a spe-
cific intelligence gathering activity can be shown
to serve either the short-term national security in-
terest of a particular state, or the long-term goals
of international stability and international peace
and security, that operation would surely comply
with the Charter, and indeed most operations do.
It is important to clarify that it is in the interest
of the international community to establish such
a low bar on lawful espionage and allow States to
collect foreign intelligence relatively freely. In his
first State of the Union Address, President George
Washington said that: "Itlo be prepared for war
is one of the most effectual means of preserving
peace': When policy makers are provided with suf-
ficiently accurate information as to the levels and
types of threats posed by their adversaries, their
intentions and capabilities, they are more likely to
calibrate their responses properly and are less like-
ly to rely on force as a means for guarding against
startling attacks or strategic surprises. Indeed,
"the key to contemporary global security is a reli-
able and unremitting flow of intelligence to the pin-
nacle elites." 8 Espionage becomes a means of en-
suring leaders "peace of mind' 'and with peaceful
mind comes a peaceful foreign policy. Intelligence
collection should thus be considered the interna-
tional community's relief valve, helping to control
and limit the pressure in the system, which could
otherwise build up to potential conflicts.
Certain modern treaties even set a positive obliga-
tion on States to routinely gather and share intel-
ligence in order to achieve these stabilizing public
world order goals, either bilaterally or multilater-
ally. Take for example the 1972 Treaty on the Limi-
tation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems between
the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In Article XII both
parties agreed that for "the purpose of providing
assurance or compliance with the provisions of
this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical
means of verification at its disposal in a manner
consistent with generally recognized principles of
international law." Similar intelligence collection
arrangements were introduced into the Strategic
Arms Limitations and Reductions Treaties.
Many argue that these bilateral intelligence-gath-
ering arrangements were part of the reason why
the Cold War did not deteriorate into a full blown
nuclear conflict between the two super powers.
On a multilateral setting, consider, for example, the
obligations under Article 15(b) of the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bomb-
ings of 1997 which again calls on State parties to
ILSA Quarterly >> volume24 > issue3 >> February2016
Espionage as a Sovereign Right
"(collect and) exchange accurate and reliable infor-
mation" on certain types of terrorist activity (this
obligation was reechoed by U.N. Security Council
Chapter VII Resolution 1373 which further called
upon States to "intensify and accelerate" the ex-
change of "operational information, especially re-
garding actions or movements of terrorist persons
or networks"). In both these examples we see an
anchoring of the Jus Ad Explorationem into treaty
form, when such spying is done in service of the
broader interests of international community.
The tale of intelligence collection, however, does
not always align itself with a Washingtonian en-
hancement of peace. Certain intelligence collec-
tion activities may not strengthen international
stability but rather would result in defeating it. In-
telligence collections activities which are launched
for reasons other than to protect the narrow na-
tional security interests of a relevant State, are of
particular concern. It is in those precise moments
that we should wonder whether Dr. Jekyll had
turned into Mr. Hyde, whether the right to spy, the
Jus Ad Explorationem, has been abused by a sov-
ereign state. This can happen when the right is ex-
ploited in a way that injuriously affects the broader
interests of the international community writ large
in the name of ensuring some short-term non-
existential economic or political national interest.
One such example is the phenomenon of States
turning to espionage as a mean of anti-diplomacy.
III. The Prohibition on Espionage as a form of
Anti-diplomacy
Professor James Der Derian introduced the term
"Anti-diplomacy" in a book of the same title pub-
lished in 1992. In the book, Der Derian noted that:
new technological practices and universal dan-
gers, mediated by the particular interests of the
national security state, have generated a new
anti-diplomacy."9 Put differently, when a specific
spying operation is conducted against the raison
d'btre of our public international system, when
such an operation is antithetical to the spirit of the
U.N. Charter, such an operation should be viewed
as an abuse of the right to spy and must be pro-
hibited. In this regard, the new Charter world order
has moved us away from the days of Nizam Al-
Mulk or Sir Francis Walsingham. For them, every
intelligence operation was inherently justified, and
no target was ever immune. Under the Charter
there are reasons to stigmatize those operations
that would cause a chilling effect on international
cooperation, on the future negotiations of treaties,
or on the engagements of States with adjudicative
bodies, or on the work of the U.N. and other in-
tergovernmental mechanisms. Let us look at one
particularly relevant case study in this regard.
On 20 September 2004, Timor-Leste and Australia
began a new round of negotiations concerning a
treaty for the development of a gas extraction field
in the Timor Sea known as the "Greater Sunrise
Field'.' Agents from the Australian Secret Intel-
ligence Service (ASIS) masquerading as employ-
ees for an Australian construction company (which
operated in Timor-Leste as part of Australian aid
programs in the country) installed recording de-
vices into the walls of the Timor-Leste's cabinet
and prime minister's offices in Dili. Relying on
these devices Australia surveils internal discus-
sions pertaining to the negotiations. It obtains
sensitive information relating to both Timor-Leste's
negotiation strategies and potential vulnerabilities.
The final treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements
in the Timor Sea (CMATS), signed on 12 January
2006, had Timor-Leste willfully give away 50% of
all revenues from the field as well as commit itself
to a moratorium on asserting and establishing its
disputed maritime boundaries in the Timor Sea for
50 years (the period of the CMATS). As reported
by Gwynne Dyer of the Telegram:
The operation would never have come to light
if the former director of technical operations at
ASIS [known as Officer X - A.L.1, who led the
bugging operation, had not had an attack of con-
science... He told East Timor about it, and the
Timorese government then brought an action
before the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The
ILSA Quarterly >> volume 24 >> issue3 February 2016
a
'Espionage as a Sovereign Right
Hague demanding that the CMATS treaty be
cancelled. The Australian government's response
was to arrest the whistleblower and cancel his
passport last week so that he could not travel
to The Hague to testify, and to raid the Sydney
offices of Bernard Collaery, the lawyer who is
representing East Timor before the court. The
documents seized include an affidavit summa-
rizing the whistleblower's testimony at the court
and correspondence between Collaery and his
client, Timorese President Xanana Gusmao. 10
In this context, Australia employed espionage in
order to achieve unfair advantages during treaty
negotiations. This harm is perhaps further exacer-
bated by the fact that the overall goal of Australia,
a regional economic giant, was to thieve from its
poorest former-colonized neighbor one of its only
natural resources. If that is not enough, Australia
continued to hinder onTimor-Leste's ability to adju-
dicate the matter by raiding the offices of the law-
yerTimor-Leste hired.
In Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, John le Carr6 writes:
"morality was vested in the aim... Difficult to know
what one's aims are, that's the trouble, specially if
you're British." While the existence, let alone the
aims, of intelligence operations are indeed hard to
identify, once they are made clear, as in the case
of Timor-Leste Australia espionage scandal, a red
line should be immediately drawn. Australia may
not claim any national security interest in spy-
ing on its neighbor, nor may it claim any broader
interest of the international community being
protected by its actions. Contrary, its espionage
was a well-planned and well-executed act of anti-
diplomacy induced by the selfish greed and glut-
tony of a hoggish sovereign. Its spying shook the
confidence in the very foundations of international
law, from the capacity to conduct good faith treaty
negotiations to the ability to effectively resolve dis-
putes through international judicial bodies. Thus,
Australia provides us with a prime example of a
clear abuse of the right to spy. It has used the right
for purposes other than the ones for which it was
initially created, and in a way which impeded the
enjoyment by other States of their own rights. Any
further scholarly delimitation of the boundaries of
the JusAd Explorationem would therefore have to
start with this case study in mind.
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